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Thinking about closures and social agency 
Closures remain a recurrent feature in contemporary economy and society. 
Individuals, households, communities, organisations and places can 
experience the closure of a bank branch, community centre, factory, farm, 
hospital, mine, office or shop and its effects – lost jobs, output, income and 
service provision – as challenges to their prosperity and wellbeing. Social 
solidarity, political outlook, cultural identity and psychological health may be 
affected too. As persistent phenomena in the historical geography of 
capitalism, mobilisation and resistance to closures have long traditions, often 
wedded to the workplace-based struggles of the labour movement in the 
industrialised nations during the 20th Century.  
 
How we think about closures and social action or agency makes a difference 
to politics and strategic practices. This intervention outlines a geographical 
political economy approach that interprets a closure as made up of social 
relations and characterised by a social process of production that unfolds over 
time, across space and in place (Pike 2005). If you divide up a closure into 
different time periods or ‘moments’ in time and space (Harvey 1996), a 
historically evolving social process of closure reveals differential potential to 
enable or inhibit social agency through public policy and institutional action 
and political mobilisation and resistance. Spaces can open up or contract to 
support or hinder intervention by the institutions of state and civil society 
and/or coalitions of resistance. Closures do not set in train inevitable 
processions of predetermined events but neither are they simply the 
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undetermined actions of wholly autonomous agents acting independently of 
broader contexts. 
 
In recent decades, the social agency associated with closures has become 
more geographically differentiated and place-specific with marked 
geographical unevenness between the extremes of muted acceptance and 
active contest (Pike 2005). David Harvey’s (1996) recent work is helpful in 
attempting to explain such geographical variation. He differentiates between 
potentially conflicting or complementary workplace and community politics. 
Workplace interests typically focus upon existing jobs and shape the particular 
forms of local social relations, institutions and political identities. Community 
interests are necessarily more broadly based beyond the workplace and may 
be concerned with wider and longer-term questions of sustainable local 
prosperity and wellbeing. Workplace and community politics can converge in 
supportive coalitions or diverge in division and conflict. Encouraged by 
narratives of inter-territorial competition and ‘globalisation’, responses to 
closure can regress into appeals to save a specific economic entity at the 
expense of another elsewhere; defending place while betraying class (Beynon 
and Hudson 1993). Specific local articulations between workplace and 
community politics shape the extent and character of social agency in 
particular places. Individual and collective action can seek to align and 
connect workplace and community politics.  
 
Revisiting class and territory as bases for social and political organisation, 
David Harvey (1996: 32) also draws upon Raymond Williams’ notion of 
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‘militant particularism’ as the way “ideals forged out of the affirmative 
experience of solidarities in one place get generalized and universalized as a 
working model of a new form of society that will benefit all humanity”. Such 
attachments forged by localised social relations intertwine with workplace and 
community politics in particular ways in particular places. Particular historical 
contexts profoundly influence and shape the extent and nature of the 
articulation and expression of social agency. The particular ways in which the 
social relations of closure and its social process of production have unfolded 
over time, across space and in place reveal much about the limits and 
prospects of social agency. Drawing upon longstanding experience in 
studying closures, action research projects for trade unions and ongoing study 
of the geographical political economy of North East England, this chapter 
offers some analysis and reflections on the limits and prospects of social 
agency based on the experience of the unsuccessful struggles to prevent the 
closures of International Research and Development (IRD) in Newcastle Upon 
Tyne (Pike 2005) and the Vaux Brewery in Sunderland (Pike 2006). 
 
 
The limits and prospects of social agency: recent experience in North 
East England 
The ‘carboniferous capitalism’ of the nineteenth century forged the particular 
character of regional social relations and institutions in North East England 
through, sometimes paternalistic, industrial pioneers and moderate, often 
accommodative, trade unionism (Austrin and Beynon 1997). Labourism, 
welfarism and neo-corporatism between business, the state and trade unions 
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are historic regional hallmarks of political and institutional cultures that retain 
an uneven influence across the North East (Shaw 1993). Long-run decline of 
its industrial base entrenched state management of the North East’s 
economically weak and politically peripheral branch plant economy (Hudson 
1989; Pike 1999). Historically, social agency mobilised around closures in 
traditional industries, often orchestrated by organised labour and local 
authorities, and radical community development plans during the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s (North Tyneside Trades Council 1979; Hudson and Sadler 
1986). Such collective action has largely waned, bar periodic and limited local 
cases, amid a sense of inevitability concerning the predicament of the region 
and a politics of post-industrial modernisation (Robinson 2002). Closures 
have become accepted symptoms of volatile and globalised investment flows 
met by standardised institutional responses such as task forces (Pike 2002). 
The particular historical legacies of place in North East England are central to 
the limits and prospects of social agency around closures. Critically too, each 
of the following discussions of the limits and potential of social agency are 
framed in the context of dealing with actually existing capitalism. These social 
relations have circumscribed and limited, though not wholly excluded, 
discussion of alternatives. 
 
 
Workplace resistance 
The social agency of workplace resistance to closures refers to worker, trade 
union or even local management-led initiatives seeking to contest and/or 
ameliorate the impact of closures. Such workplace resistance has been 
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markedly uneven. The prolonged nature of de-industrialisation in the North 
East has underpinned the dominance of workplace politics, supported by an 
allied community politics, and its militant particularisms have been largely 
accommodative to the needs of capital and the modernisation strategies of 
the national state and regional institutions (Pike 2005). Safeguarding jobs has 
been a recurrent concern (Robinson 2002). With a history of moderate trade 
unionism and joint working with management, the IRD Joint Union Committee 
sought clarification, challenged the closure proposal and lack of consultation, 
pursued enhanced workforce redundancy and closure payments and 
represented transferred members. Dissent and challenge to the parent 
company’s closure proposal came from a team of highly skilled engineers. 
From an 84-strong workforce, a total of 13 each refused to relocate to the 
newly centralised R&D centre in the East Midlands. Unwillingness to leave the 
North East, reproduce the regional traditions of working away from home and 
the rejection of the offer of enhanced salaries (up to 15% higher) and 
temporary contracts explained the outcomes. Rather than an explicit 
expression of labour solidarity and trade union activism, however, such action 
represented the collective sum of individual decisions undermining a key 
element of the parent company’s argument for IRD’s closure. It also forced 
their redeployment at another parent company factory in the North East.  
 
At the Vaux Brewery, the workforce and trade unions were effectively 
marginalised in the prolonged Boardroom struggle and eventual decision to 
exit brewing and support closure and asset disposal (Pike 2006). Limited 
workplace resistance was evident amongst an ageing workforce whose 
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resignation to their fate became more pronounced as the closure unfolded. 
Enhancing redundancy terms and protecting pensions dominated workforce 
concerns about preserving current and future income within a capitalist 
economy. Workplace resistance, then, is shaped by specific histories and 
legacies of economic roles, culture and politics, and the degree and scope for 
activism in particular circumstances. Its prospects are strongly conditioned by 
the specific workplace situation and context. 
 
 
Residual productivism 
In the context of a closure, residual productivism is focused upon salvaging 
the affected economic activity and/or its assets under different ownership 
structures. This social agency holds out the potential of resurrecting all or 
parts of the existing businesses with new owners and/or managers. 
Connections to distinctive, locally and regionally appropriate forms of 
development may be feasible (Pike, Rodríguez-Pose and Tomaney 2006). 
New or different strategies may be developed with more locally and regionally 
embedded and/or sustainable economic activities. Actually existing capitalism 
looms large, however, as often formidable issues of markets, capital and 
restructuring often need to be confronted. Despite the precedent of successful 
spin-off companies on Tyneside from technical staff in IRD under previous 
rationalisations, none emerged from its eventual closure because of parent 
company restrictions on equipment re-use and sale. The social relations of 
ownership and control in the capitalist economy determined the outcome. A 
further attempt to re-integrate the instrumentation team at a sub-sea 
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technology centre in the region foundered on the need for funding prior to the 
team establishing a viable position in external markets.  
 
In contrast, a local management-led Management Buy-Out (MBO) sought to 
purchase the Vaux Brewery and numerous of its pubs, backed by venture 
capital from institutions based in the City of London. Dispute over the 
valuation of its bid between different financial analysts and advisors led 
eventually, after a prolonged boardroom struggle, to the rejection of this 
option (Pike 2006). Even if successful, the Vaux MBO would still have faced 
the same problems that threatened the incumbent business including small 
size, regional brands, licensed lager brewing, inefficient vertical integration, 
relatively weak productivity and high employment levels, and heavy capital 
investment needs for modernisation. The only ‘non-capitalist’ alternative to 
emerge was the newly formed Vaux Tenants Association (VTA) which 
launched an unsuccessful attempt collectively to purchase their pubs. Again, 
even if successful, the VTA members would still have had to secure capital to 
purchase and upgrade the properties, negotiate supply deals with brewing 
companies, and cope with the changing beer market. While not impossible, 
without the leadership, motivation, expertise and networks these are 
challenging tasks to organise on a non-capitalist basis especially for a new 
organisation. Necessary engagement with the capitalist economy – to a 
greater or lesser degree – would have faced both the MBO and the tenants’ 
association. Residual productivism offers some possibilities for new 
combinations of economic activities but requires imagination and drive to 
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overcome the often entrenched barriers that threatened the viability of the 
original business.  
 
 
Shareholder activism 
In the context of ‘financialised’, pension fund capitalism (Clark 2000; Williams 
2000),  shareholder activism articulates the voice of shareholder owners in 
their principal-agent relationship with corporate management. Shareholders 
have recently become more vociferous and proactive in overseeing and 
protecting the value of their investments and more closely scrutinising 
management strategy and decision-making (Christopherson 2002). Wider 
private shareholding and personal savings, especially pensions, have meant 
people can be simultaneously workers and shareholders – further dividing and 
complicating social relations and social identities (Pike 2006) (Table 1). 
During a closure, divided interests may emerge as workers and managers 
may want a continuation of their employment relation and wage from working 
in the firm and the maximum return on their savings and pensions invested in 
their and/or other firms by City institutions. As Williams (2000: 9) notes: 
“…what worker/shareholders lose through wage cuts could be compensated 
by the gains of shareholder/workers in asset price appreciation”. 
 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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For the Vaux Brewery, 15 institutional shareholders owned over two thirds of 
its owner The Swallow Group, concentrated amongst two of the City’s largest 
funds managers (Table 2). A meeting convened by the Bishop of Durham and 
Sunderland’s Industrial Chaplain in an attempt to influence institutional 
investors was dismissed as: “a distraction from trying to maximise the 
economic value for our client shareholdings rather than support a ‘lame duck’ 
industry in Sunderland” (Author’s interview, 2001, cited in Pike 2006: 24). The 
Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA), Durham County Council, MPs and The 
Sunderland Echo sought an explanation and a vote on the closure but even 
together their shareholdings were less than the 10% necessary to trigger an 
Extra-ordinary General Meeting to scrutinise and challenge company strategy. 
Even with such a meeting, their voice may have been overwhelmed by the 
massed ranks of proxy votes held by institutional investors and lined up by the 
corporate management. Significantly, however, one institutional shareholder 
acknowledged that it: “could have looked beyond the narrow financial 
calculus” if acting for local authority clients otherwise its job was to “step back 
from local views” (Author’s interview 2001 cited in Pike 2006: 24). Similarly for 
IRD, shareholding interests aligned with the anti-closure coalition were of 
insufficient size seriously to influence decision-making within its parent 
company. Moreover, trade union pension fund trustees have their own 
fiduciary duties for prudent stewardship of funds in order to meet the pension 
liabilities of members. Attempting to wield financial voice through the social 
relations embodied in share ownership necessarily confronts the concentrated 
social power of institutional and increasingly private investors in the City of 
London and in other financial centres. 
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Local and regional plural coalitions 
Outside but intimately connected to the workplace, community politics can 
mobilise and underpin the formation of local and regional plural coalitions 
against closures. Such alliances were assembled around both the IRD and 
the Vaux Brewery closures. Both were plural in structure, encompassing 
workforces, political representatives, academia and civil society including the 
Church and campaign groups. IRD’s Joint Union Committee mobilised 
community politics for a political and media anti-closure campaign and 
alternative strategy, using public representatives to lobby the parent company 
Board. The Vaux Chairman’s commercial, social and political networks 
mobilised a cross-class alliance against the brewery closure, drawing upon a 
supportive community politics dormant since the 1980s Wearside shipyards’ 
demise. CAMRA launched the ‘Save Our Breweries, Save Our Beer’ 
campaign and Sunderland Football Club staged a ‘Red Card’ protest at a 
game and changed its sponsorship deal. While relatively broadly based, 
symbolically and politically important and demonstrating effort and ingenuity, 
both local and regional coalitions failed successfully to contest the social 
power of ownership and control exercised by the parent companies of IRD 
and the Vaux Brewery. The closures unfolded, mediated rather than 
determined by the social agency of the plural coalitions. 
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Institutions of government and governance 
Institutions of government and governance responsible for local and regional 
development have potentially decisive roles to play in the social agency 
around closures. In the particular context of North East England and 
prevailing political-economic order at the national and European Union levels, 
their agency and ability to shape such events at specific moments of potential 
intervention is often limited. Taking threatened business concerns into 
wholesale or partial state ownership – even if national states had the political 
will – typically runs up against EU competition and state aid regulations. 
Institutionalised politics framed the collective diagnosis of the IRD and Vaux 
Brewery closures by local and regional development institutions: private 
decisions by private companies. Involvement is commonly restricted within the 
scope of existing local and regional policy, although neither had sufficient jobs 
or importance to merit the typical recourse to a task force (Pike 2002). Amid 
dithering over the significance of the closure and squabbles over territorial 
responsibility and funding support, a partnership was eventually convened 
behind closed doors to address IRD’s plight. A ‘business case’ for public 
funding to support the retention of jobs at existing operations in the North East 
was put to the parent company’s board but no application for assistance was 
forthcoming. A total of £6m in regional policy grants was offered to safeguard 
employment at the Vaux Brewery, narrowing its valuation relative to the MBO 
offer, before the closure and asset disposal option was chosen by the board. 
Whether through unwillingness or inability to intervene, local and regional 
institutions of government and governance had little impact that could be 
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discerned upon the closures of IRD and the Vaux Brewery. Efforts were 
focused upon post-redundancy employment and retraining support, and post-
closure regeneration of the newly redundant sites.  
 
 
Alternative models 
In the context of closure, alternative models are often predicated on the need 
for: “an element of de-commodification or socialisation, since only this can 
‘neutralise’ the floating electric charge of capital by tying it to the ‘earth’ of 
mutual or public property, which can no longer be bought and sold” 
(Blackburn 2002: 502). Non-capitalist alternatives were clearly possible for 
IRD and the Vaux Brewery but in these particular closure situations they failed 
to emerge. The ‘associative entrepreneurship’ (Scott Cato 2004) of a mutual 
or co-operative ownership structure or trade union-sponsored pension fund 
may have provided alternatives to anchor the capital in place and save IRD 
and Vaux. But, like the failed MBO for Vaux and the VTA bid for its members’ 
pubs, any anti-closure coalition voices making claims on the future of the 
assets of IRD and Vaux (O’Neill and Gibson-Graham 1999) would have had 
to return to the capital market with the necessary investment to acquire 
ownership of the assets in order to convert them into mutual and/or public 
property. Unless they were cash-based, such funds would have cost interest 
and/or would have needed to generate a return for their capitalist lenders.  
 
Even with any potential change in ownership, the markets for any emergent 
economic activities largely remained in the capitalist segment of the economy, 
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whether contract R&D for IRD or pubs, clubs and other outlets for the Vaux 
Brewery. Moreover, these were the very markets that had changed adversely, 
contributed and been utilised by parent companies to articulate the closure 
proposals for IRD and Vaux. For example, the traditional ale market for 
Vaux’s output declined significantly since the 1960s in the wake of 
‘lagerisation’ (Figure 1). IRD’s parent company foreclosed any possibility of 
spin-off businesses or new ownership by placing restrictions on the re-use of 
equipment. The prolonged closure of the Vaux Brewery undermined the 
goodwill of potential customers and suppliers before finally severing its 
distribution network with the sale of the tied pub estate to a Pub Company. 
Bishop Auckland MP and Vaux shareholder Derek Foster’s City consortium 
failed to materialise. The idea or economics of socially useful production with 
IRD or Vaux’s assets in the British traditions of the 1970s alternative 
economic strategies and community-led development did not enter the picture 
(See Wainwright and Elliot 1982; Loney 1983; Coates 2003). Compounding 
the lack of discussion of alternatives were the lack of a regional leader or 
precedent - like the employee buy-out at Tower Colliery in Wales (Scott Cato 
2004) – and the stronger historical traditions of corporatism rather than co-
operativism embedded in regional social structures in the North East. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Conclusions and reflections for politics and praxis 
The experience of IRD and Vaux – amongst many other recent closures (Pike 
1999) – in North East England is largely negative with little evidence to 
sustain optimism in the potential of progressive and developmental resistance 
to closures. However, a geographical political economy approach to closure 
can – at least in principle – still lead to the emergence of opportunities to 
render the closure process open to social agency to attempt to shape the 
unfolding process of closure to produce particular outcomes. As we argued at 
the outset, closure proposals and decisions do not set in train inevitable, 
predetermined processions of events. The structural imperatives and social 
power of globalising forms of capitalism are enacted and mediated through 
social relations and institutions over time, across space and in place. Though, 
as the experience in North East England suggests, this is not to imply that 
closures are easily or unproblematically stopped or transformed into positive 
outcomes. Indeed, by the time a situation is recognised as a closure it may 
already be too late to do much about it. 
 
While the relatively narrow range of political tactics and social practices used 
by the anti-closure campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s were consistent 
failures they revealed: “evidence that workers, their families and communities 
were not passively accepting the negative local impacts of corporate and state 
strategies” (Beynon and Hudson 1993: 178). Although bedevilled with 
potential constraints, the social agency of individuals, collectives and 
organisations – workforces, trade unions, local management, local, regional 
and national state institutions, civil society, communities, households, 
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individuals – remain integral to the unfolding social process of closure. 
Closures do not happen without the social agency of individuals, groups and 
organisations. Applying leverage to critical moments – albeit difficult to 
recognise and mobilise around at specific points during a closure – may offer 
some possibilities to ameliorate and/or challenge the potentially damaging 
effects of closures through a politics based upon progressive collective action 
and social agency. 
 
Workplace resistance, residual productivism, shareholder activism, local and 
regional plural coalitions, institutions of government and governance and 
alternative models yielded uneven and largely unsuccessful results in 
contesting the closures of IRD and Vaux in North East England. The same 
strategies may foster different outcomes in the particular contexts and 
situations of other closures in other places. Institutions in the devolved 
administrations may have the autonomy, discretion, resources and political 
will to experiment with more innovative approaches. Localised coalitions of 
resistance can moderate the powers exercised by firms both internally and 
across networks of organisations, although such ‘tactics of resistance’ may be 
strongly influenced by the nature of their geographical origins and may not 
easily transferred to other places (Phelps and Waley 2004). There is more 
than one ‘moment’ and possible agency through which to intervene in a 
closure process, however. Other possibilities than those discussed above 
exist too, including employee buy-outs (Wills and Lincoln 1999), social 
enterprises (Amin, Cameron and Hudson 2002) and work-ins (Foster and 
Woolfson 1986). 
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Recent work has sought to destabilise and ‘think around’ and ‘instead of’ 
capitalism (Gibson-Graham 1996; Gibson-Graham 2003; Gibson-Graham 
Forthcoming). Despite its laudable intentions, this work has attracted criticism. 
Scott (2004) argues against the relativism of Gibson-Graham’s (1996: 260) 
main thesis that “the way to begin to break free of capitalism is to turn its 
prevalent representations on their heads”. In particular, he highlights the likely 
difficulties of translating this agenda into a practical and political project since 
it presents: 
 
Not even a hint about a possible transitional program, or a few 
suggestions about, say, practical reform of the banking system. The 
claim is presented in all its baldness, without any apparent 
consciousness that attempts to break free of any given social system 
are likely to run into the stubborn realities of its indurated social and 
property relations as they actually exist (Scott 2004): 491). 
 
Such alternative agendas are politically important but present formidable 
challenges for social agency in having to deal with actually existing capitalism. 
This is especially the case where institutions of capitalism have caused a 
closure and need to be actively engaged with in any attempts at policy and 
strategic practice or, indeed, rebuilding economic activity from discarded 
assets, places, skills and people. That non-capitalist alternatives for IRD and 
Vaux failed to emerge in the North East might be the result of the lack of 
precedents and experience in the region. Or, at worse, it may reflect the 
G:\ALL\e-
theses\eprints\authorversion\queriesembargoes\pikeawaitingpublishersresponse.doc 
18 
failure of political-economic imagination, a weakness of collective action 
and/or institutions, and fatalism concerning the economic and political 
predicament of the region. 
 
The context of particular places remains central, for example in old industrial 
territories like North East England and Scotland, in circumscribing the limits 
and potential for social agency. Workplace and community politics and militant 
particularisms are characterised by particular histories and legacies of 
entrenched economic, social and political structures, practices and 
institutions. As even Gibson-Graham (Forthcoming: 25) accept: 
 
Just as the state electricity worker who has been retrenched because 
of privatisation in the Latrobe Valley of Australia, or the manufacturing 
worker whose factory has closed because of Argentina’s economic 
crisis wants his old job, not an alternative economy, so the rural Filipino 
tends to want the dole out, not a role in the community economy. 
 
Alternatives to capitalism may only offer limited and perhaps unrealisable or, 
for labour historically dependent upon the wage economy, even unacceptable 
or unpalatable possibilities for social agency in such a context.  
 
Given their authority and potential resources in the context of closure 
situations, the weakness and circumscribed nature of the social agency of the 
institutions of government and governance responsible for local and regional 
development is perhaps most disappointing. While not advocating a narrowly 
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statist response or hoping the local management, workforce or civil society 
could or should pick up the pieces, the poverty of imagination and 
unwillingness even to attempt to encourage or persuade private firms to work 
more closely with the grain of a local and regional development framework 
during a closure is profoundly unhelpful. The lightly regulated economy in the 
UK, with its ease of access and withdrawal for capital, has nothing 
approaching the higher redundancy costs, mandatory social plans and 
managed closure processes institutionalised in many EU Member States. It is, 
quite simply, easier and cheaper to hire and fire labour in the UK than many 
other Members States because of its particular political economic regulation 
of the economy. This kind of regulation influences the character of economic 
activities attracted to and undertaken in the UK, typically skewed toward the 
‘low road’ of low skills, low technology, low productivity and low wages. 
Elsewhere in Europe, especially France and Germany, regulation is used 
more effectively to establish and sustain a ‘high road’ of high skills, high 
technology, high productivity and high wages.  
 
The ineffectiveness and tightly limited range of the financial and institutional 
responses of local and regional development institutions reveal a deeper 
malaise in the  ‘quasi-governance’ of economic development that is largely 
unaccountable (especially at the local and regional level), technocratic and 
opaque (Pike 2004). This situation is particularly acute in English regions such 
as the North East with the RDA, Government Office and Regional Chamber 
model. A more accountable, democratised and transparent politics of local 
and regional development is needed. Such a politics may be capable of 
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prompting and supporting public debate about what kind of local and regional 
development and for whom (Pike, Rodríguez-Pose and Tomaney 2006). It 
could question why closures are happening. It may develop innovative public 
interventions to salvage the fragments and reintegrate discarded assets back 
into local and regional economies and consider alternative – including non-
capitalist - strategies. Commitments by the state and civil society to alternative 
conceptions of the corporation that invite contestation (O'Neill 2003) and 
consideration of the “proliferation of alternative possibilities for regional futures 
and corporate-community relations” (O'Neill and Gibson-Graham 1999: 20) 
are sorely needed to support social agency in its struggles against closures in 
local and regional economies. From the perspective of the English regions, 
we look to the devolved territories to take the lead and demonstrate what an 
innovative political-economic imagination can achieve. 
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Table 1: Social Relations and Social Identities 
 
Social Relations Social Identities Linkage/articulation 
Employment/ownership 
 
Worker/shareholder Firm/capital market 
Ownership/employment Shareholder/worker Capital market/firm 
Source: Adapted from Pike (2006) 
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Table 2: Top 15 Institutional Shareholdings in Swallow Group, 1999* 
Fund Manager Holding (No. 
of Shares) 
 
% Value (£)**** 
Phillips and Drew** 26,312,908 17.90 80,254,369 
Mercury Asset Management*** 18,741,682 12.75 57,162,130 
Britannic Assurance 8,810,585 5.99 26,872,284 
Perpetual 7,730,053 5.26 23,576,661 
Caledonia Investments 6,844,413 4.66 20,875,459 
Legal and General  5,507,509 3.75 16,797,902 
Prudential 5,126,456 3.49 15,635,690 
Barclays Global (UK)  3,341,441 2.27 10,191,395 
Company 2,914,874 1.98 8,890,365 
Equitable Life 2,772,170 1.89 8,455,118 
Standard Life 2,279,379 1.55 6,952,105 
United Friendly 1,970,615 1.34 6,010,375 
Henderson 1,968,941 1.34 6,005,270 
Axa Sun Life 1,544,397 1.25 4,710,410 
Hermes 1,774,274 1.21 5,411,535 
    
Total Top 15 Institutional 
Shareholdings 
97,639,697 66.63 297,801,075 
    
Total Shareholdings 146,540,142 100.00 446,947,433 
 
* As of 2 March 1999. ** Union Bank of Switzerland. *** Merrill Lynch. **** 305 
pence per share (1999 average). 
 
Source: Calculated from Swallow Group PLC 
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Figure 1: UK beer market sales by type, 1960-1998 
 
 
 
Source: Beer and Licensed Retailers Association 
 
